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The First Amendment stipulates that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 1 These cumulative rights create a person's freedom of expression.2 Courts have long
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Commentators have espoused two different views of how
to interpret First Amendment issues. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 12-2, at 582 (1978). An absolutist approach denies the government any power
to curtail First Amendment rights. Id.; DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 781 (1989) (citation omitted). The competing approach, however, promotes balancing opposing concerns of free speech interests and governmental objectives. Id. (citations omitted); TRIBE, supra, at 582.
2 See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-1, at 576 (discussing the "first amendment's protections of speech, press, assembly, petition, and (by implication) association"); CRUMP
ET AL., supra note 1, at 784 ("Although the first amendment does not expressly create
a right of association, the right has been inferred from it.. . ."). The courts classify
government regulation that restricts freedom of expression by the communicative impact of the affected expression. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 783 (citations omitted) (explaining the dichotomy between "content-neutral" regulation and regulation
based on the expressive content of a particular communication). If the state regulates
speech based upon the communicative impact of expression, such regulation is considered content-based, and courts will subject the regulation to strict scrutiny review.
Id. (citations omitted); see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (citations
omitted) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.... The essence of... forbidden censorship is content control."). Such
content-based regulation presumptively is unconstitutional. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 122, at 581. To meet strict scrutiny, a regulation must serve a compelling government
interest and be tailored narrowly to achieve that interest. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980)) ("For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.").
A content-based regulation only escapes strict scrutiny if it falls under a category
that is not protected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity, defamation, advocacy of imminent lawless behavior, or fighting words. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at
782 (describing "unprotected utterances" that are considered "speech that is not
speech"); see, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500, 501 (1987) (noting that the First
Amendment does not protect obscene materials, but only protects works that reasonable persons find to possess "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value");
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (propounding that
speech intended to and likely to incite imminent lawless behavior is not protected by
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the First Amendment); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)
(recognizing that the First Amendment does not shelter libelous statements);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (acknowledging that words
directly inclined to provoke the targeted listener to violence, or "fighting words," do
not receive First Amendment shelter). If the expression falls within an unprotected
category, the government can prohibit the expression based on its content without
any impediment from the First Amendment. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 782
("[O]ne way to approach the limits of the first amendment is by defining 'speech' so
that it does not cover every kind of 'utterance.'"); cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72, 773 (1976) (finding
that commercial speech is not an unprotected category, and therefore may not be
suppressed based on the possible effects of its content). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that regulation of speech that falls into an unprotected category
cannot discriminate on the basis of content where such discrimination is not reasonably necessary to achieve government interests. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2541, 2548, 2550 (1992) (concluding that a bias-motivated crime ordinance that
specifically dealt with a cross-burning incident impermissibly was content-based because it prevented too specific a category of expression).
If the state aims a regulation at something other than the communicative impact
of the expression, then the regulation is deemed content-neutral and receives intermediate, or mid-level, review. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted). A regulation will only be upheld under intermediate review if the regulation: (1) furthers a
significant government interest; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve that interest; and (3)
leaves open alternative means for communicating the information. Id. (citations
omitted); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (citations omitted) (noting that expression is subject to reasonable restrictions
regarding the "time, place, or manner" of a given communication, as long as such
regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the.., speech .... are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information"). A regulation is
narrowly tailored if there is no less restrictive alternative to achieve the same result.
See TRIBE, supranote 1, § 12-8, at 602-03. Furthermore, when the government restricts
speech that takes place in a public forum through a regulation confining the time,
place, or manner of speech, the regulation must be content-neutral and meet intermediate level review. Community for Creative Non-Vtolence 468 U.S. at 293 (citations
omitted).
To pass constitutional muster, any government action affecting protected speech
must not be vague or overbroad. CRUMP ET AL., supranote 1, at 782. A statute restricting conduct is unconstitutionally vague if the conduct is so unclearly defined that a
reasonable person would have to guess at the statute's meaning. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973) (citations & quotation omitted) (holding that a
challenged statute gave adequate notice to affected persons of what activities were
proscribed). A regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad if, although it properly restricts constitutionally forbidden speech, the scope of the restriction extends to
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. TRiBE, supra note 1, § 12-24, at 71011 (quotation omitted) (defining and analyzing the concept of overbreadth); see e.g.,
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 106, 107 (1940) (finding that a regulation
restricting picketing was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered activities
that did not affect the state's interest in preventing injury to industrial concerns).
The First Amendment applies not only to pure speech, but also to conduct with
an expressive component. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632-33 (1943) (noting that symbolism, such as a flag salute, embodies an effective
means of communicating ideas). Where expression is mixed with conduct, however,
the presence of protected speech does not prohibit the state from regulating conduct
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recognized, however, that the First Amendment right to freedom
of expression is not consummate.3 When the concerns of a
speaker and an unwilling listener conflict, the courts weigh the importance of the speaker's right to communicate her ideas with the
listener's right to be left alone.4 Courts often find in favor of the
speaker, 5 but protect the reluctant listener's rights when his substantial privacy interests are invaded in an intolerable manner.6
to preserve prominent societal interests. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 573
(1965) (remarking that the state can "call a halt to a meeting which though originally
peaceful, becomes violent" and "set reasonable time limits for assemblies").
3 Note, Too Close ForComfort: Protesting Outside MedicalFacilities, 101 HARv. L. REv.
1856, 1856 (1988). In contrast to an absolutist approach to the First Amendment, a
balancing method has evolved that weighs First Amendment rights against other constitutional tenets and governmental objectives. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 781.
This balancing approach, which seeks to produce a consistent system of evaluation, is
affiliated particularly with Justice Harlan. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,

590-94 (1969)).
4 See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). In
Rowan, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Title III of the Postal Revenue and
Federal Salary Act of 1967, which empowered a person to dictate that a mailer eliminate her name from mailing lists, forcing the mailer to cease all future mailings to the
person's home. Id. at 729 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV 1969)). To enforce the
provision, a householder needed only to inform the Postmaster General that she
found the specific mailing offensive. See id. at 733 (quotation omitted). Once informed, the Postmaster General was required to instruct the mailer to refrain from
sending any further mailings to that resident. Id. (quotation omitted). The appellant, a mail-order businessman, argued that this regulation violated his First Amendment right to communicate through the postal system, an allegedly indispensable
medium. Id. at 735 (quotation omitted). The Rowan Court upheld the provision,
noting that the Supreme Court has traditionally enforced the privilege of residents to
ban solicitors and peddlers from their homes. Id. at 736-37 (citing Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943)) (other citation omitted). The Court extended that privilege by holding that a sender's right to communicate necessarily
ends at an unreceptive party's mailbox. Id. at 736-37. In so holding, the Court permitted a resident, by withholding her acquiescence, to construct a barrier through
which no solicitor may intrude. Id. at 738. The Court reasoned that although when
outside the protection of the home, citizens are often captive audiences and subject
to offensive speech, the home is a boundary at which a mailer's asserted right to
communicate stops. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, Justice Brandeis has described
"the right to be let alone" as the most extensive and most valued of rights. Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (citing Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))
(stating that the listener generally shoulders the burden of avoiding the undesired
speech).
6 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. In Cohen, the state charged the appellant under an "offensive conduct" statute for wearing ajacket inscribed with the message, "Fuck the Draft,"
while inside the Los Angeles County Courthouse. Id. at 16 (quotation omitted). The
Court held that criminalizing the mere display of the word "fuck" is unconstitutional.
Id. at 26. The Supreme Court reasoned that the government can ban speech only to
protect offended audiences where the speech intrudes upon substantial privacy interests in an outrageous manner. Id. at 21. The Court explained that to adopt a broader
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Because of the increasing intensity of the abortion debate,
abortion clinics have become a common arena where privacy interests of reluctant listeners conflict with protestors' rights of speech.7
Some lawmakers view the magnitude of anti-abortion protests occurring outside abortion clinics as tantamount to harassment and
intimidation.8 Anti-abortion demonstrators have followed patients
while waving dismembered dolls, screamed derogatory names, and
threatened patients and clinic staff,9 forcing physical closeness on
the listeners to increase the emotional impact of the protestors'
message.10 Abortion clinic physicians have testified that such protests enhance stress levels of patients, jeopardizing patients' health
test would allow the majority interest to silence minority views solely based upon personal preferences. Id. The Court found that the offensive display in Cohen did not
meet the outrageousness standard because the offended viewers easily could have
avoided further privacy invasion by averting their eyes. Id. The Court further noted
that the privacy interest of the courtroom did not reach the level of sanctity afforded
the home with regard to shielding individuals from unwelcome speech. Id. at 21-22
(citation omitted).
The courts have relied occasionally on physical boundaries to identify the kinds
of privacy interests that are deserving of protection. Note, supra note 3, at 1856. Accordingly, speech that comes within the confines of one's home or into one's mailbox
is subject to regulation. Id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978);
Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37). Beyond the home, courts have been hesitant to allow a
zone of privacy where a person may escape from unwanted speech. Id. at 1856 & n.6
(citing Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210-11). The courts, however, have protected listeners
who cannot avoid easily undesired speech. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89
(1949) (holding that an ordinance was justified by the need to protect homes and
businesses from loud broadcasts by sound trucks on public streets); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 267, 268-69 (7th Cir.
1978) (finding that listeners were protected from religious solicitation while waiting
on line for airline tickets). Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
304 (1974) (concluding that listeners should not be forced to listen to political advertising while aboard public buses) with Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
463 (1952) (holding that radio programs are permitted on bus speakers where there
is no finding of objectionable propaganda in the programs).
7 See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613
F. Supp. 656, 666, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (allowing a preliminary injunction to stop the
enforcement of a provision requiring public disclosure in the abortion context because such disclosure infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion), remanded, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), affd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
8 See Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1, 3, 130
(1987) [hereinafter Abortion Hearings].
9 American College of Obstetricians,613 F. Supp. at 661-63.
10 See Note, supranote 3, at 1856-57 (reporting protestors' use of intimidation tactics to enhance the force of the protestors' message); see e.g., American College of Obstetricians, 613 F. Supp. at 663 (describing episodes in which demonstrators leapt in
front of cars and physically blocked entrances to abortion clinics); Bering v. Share,
721 P.2d 918, 923 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (relating incidents in which protestors
hindered ingress to and egress from the clinic and grabbed both patients and staff),
cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987); Abortion Hearings, supra note 8, at 23 (describing
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and disrupting their care.'" The
impact of these protests has
12
consideration.
prompted judicial
Recently in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,"5 the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether an injunction restricting
protests at an abortion clinic violated the First Amendment rights
of the protestors. 4 The Court held that the creation of a thirty-sixfoot buffer zone around the clinic entrance and driveway and the
imposition of limited noise restrictions were constitutional.' 5 The
Court, however, found that other provisions of the injunction did
not meet constitutional standards.' 6
The respondent, Women's Health Center, managed a group
of abortion clinics in central Florida.' 7 The petitioners, including
Judy Madsen, were anti-abortion activists who protested on a public
road outside one of the clinics.'
When the demonstrators
threatened to protest near the abortion clinic, the clinic sought a
permanent injunction banning the protestors' activities. 19 Accordingly, the trial court entered an injunction prohibiting anyone
from hindering public admission to the clinic and from physically
abusing those approaching or leaving the clinic. °
Six months later, the clinic moved to broaden the injunction
when protestors continued to demonstrate actively and hamper access to the facility,2 1 discouraging potential patients 22 and causing
incidents in which protestors thrust signs into the faces of women attempting to enter
a clinic).
11 American College of Obstetricians, 613 F. Supp. at 662, 663.
12 Note, supra note 3, at 1857. Courts are divided over the issue of whether injunctions restricting abortion protest activities in proximity to abortion clinics breach the
First Amendment. Id. at 1857 n.1 (citations omitted).
13 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
14 Id. at 2521.
15 Id. at 2521, 2530.
16 Id. These other provisions established a 36-foot buffer zone on private property
alongside the clinic, banned visible images, instituted a 300-foot no-approach area
surrounding the clinic, and created a 300-foot buffer zone surrounding the homes of
the clinic staff. Id. at 2530. The Court found that these provisions swept too broadly
in accomplishing the injunction's permissible goals. Id.
17 Id. at 2521."
18 Id. The clinic was located in Melbourne, Florida. Id.
19 Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 1993)
(per curiam), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
20 Id. at 666-67 & n.4.
21 Id. at 667. The trial court found that clinic access was impeded due to the
number of protestors assembled on the street leading up to the clinic and marching
in the clinic's driveways. Id. at 667-68.
22 Id. at 668. The court intimated that patients were discouraged from entering
the clinic due to the pressure exerted by the crowd of protestors. Id.
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negative physical effects to women seeking medical assistance.s
The trial court issued a broader injunction, which prohibited the
protestors and those acting in concert with them from: entering
into a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the entrance and driveway
of the clinic; making excessive noise near the clinic or displaying
images observable to the patients within the clinic; approaching
non-consenting potential patients within 300 feet of the clinic; and
protesting within a 300-foot buffer zone around the clinic staff's
residences.2 4
The protestors appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal,25 contending that the broadened injunction violated their
right to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 26 Due
to the public importance of this issue, the court certified the cause
to the Florida Supreme Court. 27 After its deliberation, the Florida
Supreme Court found that the road adjacent to the clinic was a
traditional public forum 28 and that the provisions of the injunction
were content-neutral. 29 The court therefore acknowledged that
strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard.3 0 The supreme
court further concluded that the provisions were narrowly tailored
to protect a significant government interest while leaving protestors sufficient alternative methods of communication.3' Accord23 Id. A clinic doctor testified that the obstacles that patients needed to endure to
reach the clinic caused the patients to have higher anxiety levels, which created a
need for greater sedation prior to surgery. Id. The added sedation increased the risks
associated with the operation. Id. Noise that could be heard by patients in the clinic
undergoing or recovering from surgery also added to the patients' stress levels, increasing the risk associated with the procedure. Id. Patients who delayed their admission to the clinic due to the protestors also suffered increased health risks because of
the delay. Id. at 668-69.
24 Id. at 669.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. Specifically, the appellate court "certified the trial court's order as passing
on a matter of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by [the
Supreme Court of Florida]."
28 Id. at 671 (citation omitted) ("The forum at issue ... consists of public streets,
sidewalks, and rights-of-way, which .. . constitute a traditional public forum.").
29 Id. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the regulation was contentneutral because it limited the place and manner in which the protestors could communicate, not what the protestors were allowed to say. Id. The supreme court noted
that the provisions did not address specifically the abortion issue or any additional
political or social views. Id. The court further declared that the provisions simply
limited the volume, timing, site, and character of the protestors' expressive conduct.
Id. The court emphasized that the regulation could impede equally pro-abortion
demonstrations near the abortion clinic. Id. (quotation omitted).
30 Id. at 671-72 (quotation omitted).
31 Id. at 673. The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged several significant government interests, including a woman's liberty to seek medical assistance or counseling,
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ingly, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the injunction in its
32
entirety.
A split on this issue arose between the Florida Supreme Court
33
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Just prior to the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit heard a dispute concerning the same injunction.' While the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that the injunction was content-neutral and met intermediate scrutiny, 5 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the injunction was content-based and failed to meet the
requisite strict scrutiny standard. 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3 7 to determine whether the broadened injunction was constitutional. 8
fostering public safety and order, promoting the circulation of traffic, and protecting
property rights. Id. at 672 (citation omitted). The court further reasoned that the
privacy interest within the home, which the United States Supreme Court previously
has protected, similarly applies to medical privacy. Id. The court explained that the
anti-choice picketing was not meant to disseminate a public message, but was intended to impose upon the target in an offensive way. Id. The court found that such
intrusions invade a person's residential or medical privacy and, accordingly, a complete prohibition of that kind of expression is justified. Id. at 672, 673.
32 Id. at 675.
33 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994) (quotation
omitted).
34 Id. (quoting Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated en

banc, 41 F.3d 1421 (lth Cir. 1994)). In Cheffer, a protestor with Operation Rescue
brought suit in federal court attempting to enjoin execution of the state court injunction issued by defendant Judge McGregor of the Florida Circuit Court. Cheffer, 6 F.3d
at 706, 707-08. Cheffer claimed that the injunction violated her First Amendment
rights of free speech. Id. at 707-08. After the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida denied Cheffer's motion, she appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 708.
35 Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671-72, 675 (citation omitted).
36 Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 710, 711 (quotation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit treated the

regulation as a criminal statute, noting that the injunction "in effect, created a criminal statute prohibiting 'pro-life' free speech activity in a certain geographical location." Id. at 708. The injunction, the court determined, was content-based because
the parties affected by the injunction were pro-life activists and those acting in concert
with the activists. Id. at 710 & n.10 (quotation omitted). The court of appeals supported this finding by observing that only pro-life protestors were arrested pursuant to
the injunction. Id. at 711 & n.11. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
injunction, a content-based regulation of speech in a public forum, was unconstitutional because it did not meet strict scrutiny. Id. at 711 (citation omitted). Moreover,
the court found that interests of order and safety were protected sufficiently by other
laws without addressing the First Amendment issue. See id. at 711 n.12. The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the injunction had the effect of a criminal statute, and thus
expressed that the district court improperly treated it as an ordinary injunction. Id. at
712. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the injunction should have
been issued in light of the Eleventh Circuit's findings. Id.
37 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 907, 907 (1994).
38 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994).
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The Court acknowledged the protestors' claim that the injunction
restricted anti-abortion speech, but nevertheless ruled that the injunction was neither per se nor in-fact content-based. 39 The Court
then articulated that the appropriate level of review for this issue
was that the regulation encumber no more speech than is necessary to facilitate a "significant government interest."40 The Court
held that both the provision instituting a thirty-six-foot buffer zone
surrounding the clinic driveway and entrances and the provision
implementing limited noise restrictions did not violate the First
Amendment.4 1 The Supreme Court, however, struck down other
provisions of the injunction4 2 on the ground that the provisions
burdened more speech than was necessary to achieve significant
government interests.4 3
American jurisprudence has long recognized the importance
of ensuring First Amendment freedom of expression rights while
tempering those rights so as not to infringe upon the constitutional rights of others.4 4 In Thornhill v. Alabama,4" decided in 1940,
the United States Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute
that prohibited all picketing near businesses.' The Court recognized that First Amendment freedom of speech is a cornerstone
upon which our society is based.4 7 The circulation of information
39 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24.

Id. at 2525 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2527, 2528.
42 Id. at 2528-30. The Court determined the following provisions to be unconstitutional: the creation of a 36-foot buffer zone on private property on the sides of the
clinic, the banning of all "'images observable,'" the establishment of a 300-foot no
approach zone around the clinic, and the installation of a 300-foot buffer zone
around the residences of clinic staff. Id.
43 Id.
44 Note, supra note 3, at 1856 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)) (other citations omitted) ("When speaker's interests conflict with those of unwilling listeners, 'the right of every person "to be let alone" must
be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate."').
45 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
46 Id. at 91-92, 101. Section 3448 of the 1923 Alabama State Code made it unlawful
to loiter or picket near a business for the purpose of dissuading potential patrons or
to hinder, delay, or interfere with that business beyond mere competitive solicitation.
Id. at 91-92. A union, whose membership included 96 of the 100 workers at Brown
Wood Preserving Company, ordered a strike, during which the union established a
24-hour picket line. Id. at 94. While picketing, defendant Byron Thornhill approached a non-union employee, reminding him that the union members were on
strike and that the union wanted no one to return to work. Id. Defendant Thornhill
was arrested and convicted under § 3448 for these actions even though the non-union
employee testified that he was neither threatened nor put in fear by Thornhill or the
other picketers, but independently decided not to go to work. Id. at 94-95.
47 Id. at 102 ("Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
40
41
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regarding the issues of a labor dispute, the majority asserted, are
within the scope of the First Amendment.4" The Supreme Court
stated that the curtailment of such speech is only permitted where
there exists a clear threat of substantive evils resulting from a lack
of an available public forum in which to test the ideas.4 9 Neither
the danger of injury to industrial profits nor the mere possibility of
violence initiated by picketing, the majority determined, were serious enough threats to allow for an abridgement of demonstrators'
freedom of speech.5"
A year after the Thornhill decision, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,5" the Supreme Court examined an injunction that banned both peaceful and violent union
conduct aimed at milk retailers.5 2 The Court upheld the injunction, reasoning that the violence in this case was pervasive and that
even peaceful picketing necessarily had the effect of intimidation,
which caused retailers to believe that non-compliance would be followed by violence.5" The Supreme Court recognized the broad
scope of protection afforded speech by the First Amendment.5 4
The Court concluded, however, that the scope of those liberties
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.").
48 Id. (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 104-05. The Court noted that permitting a complete abridgment of
speech based solely upon the public concerns arising from labor disputes would legitimize freedom of speech restrictions for nearly every situation of societal importance.
Id. at 104.
50 Id. at 105. The Court noted that the statute challenged in Thornhill did not
point specifically at serious encroachments on property or privacy interests. Id.
Moreover, the Court asserted, the statute did not attempt to balance those interests
against individual free speech interests. Id. In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated
that "[ t ] he danger of breach of the peace or serious invasion of rights... at the scene
of a labor dispute is not sufficiently imminent in all cases to warrant [a determination] that such place is not appropriate for the range of activities outlawed by § 3448."
Id. at 106.
51 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
52 Id. at 291. The dispute arose out of the vendor system that was used by some
dairies to distribute milk in Chicago. Id. Pursuant to this system, dairy companies
sold milk to vendors who, operating their own trucks, resold the milk to retailers. Id.
(citation omitted). These vendors disregarded the working standards that were set by
the union for its dairy employees. Id.
53 Id. at 291, 294, 298. Witnesses testified to violent union activity surrounding the
vendor system, including: window smashing; bombing Meadowmoor Dairy; stench
bombing five stores; beating a storekeeper and truck driver; burning a store; destroying three vendor trucks; shootings; and beating dairy workers at gunpoint. Id. at 29192. The Court explained that this pervasive violence was the distinguishing factor
between this case and Thornhil where peaceful picketing was protected by the First
Amendment right to free expression. See id. at 297-98 (quotation omitted).
54 Id. at 296.
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should not preclude the state courts from contending with coercion propelled by extensive violence. 5 5 Pervasive violence, the
Court noted, was the sole justification for upholding the injunction
and, thus, the injunction should remain in force only so long as it
prevented continuing intimidation.56
In Carroll v. President of Princess Anne5 7 a case involving First
Amendment concerns surrounding an injunction within a political
context, the United States Supreme Court's pronounced standard
of constitutional scrutiny was unclear. 58 The CarrollCourt rejected
an injunction that restrained members of a white supremacist political party from holding rallies for ten days. 59 The Court based its
decision on the fact that the political party did not receive notice,
formal or informal, that the townspeople were seeking an injunction.6 0 The Supreme Court indicated that an order concerning
First Amendment rights must be fashioned in the narrowest terms
necessary to achieve a specific objective. 6 ' Participation by both
parties, the Court concluded, is necessary to meet the above standard in the drafting of an injunction.6 2
Three years later, in Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe,6"
the Supreme Court struck down an injunction that prohibited a
55 Id. at 299. The Court specified, however, that dissociated previous acts of violence are not so compelling as to outweigh First Amendment protections. Id. at 296.
Furthermore, the Court asserted that a state may not enjoin peaceful picketing activities because such activities may provoke others to commit violent acts. Id. (citations
omitted).
56 Id. at 298 ("[The injunction] is justified only by the violence that induced it and
only so long as it counteracts a continuing intimidation.").
57 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
58 Id. at 176, 183-84.
59 Id. at 177 & n.3. On August 6, 1966, the National States Rights Party held a
public rally at which petitioner made a militantly racist speech. Id. at 176. That day,
officials of the town of Princess Anne obtained an ex parte restraining order that
prohibited the Party from holding meetings in the county if such meetings would
tend to disturb or endanger citizens. Id. at 177. On August 30, 1966, the court issued
an injunction that effectively extended the restraining order for ten months. Id. at
177 & n.3.
60 Id. at 185 ("[I]t is clear that the failure to give notice .. .was incompatible with
the First Amendment .... [W]e reverse the court below on this basis ....").The
Court stressed that the record established no reason why Carroll was not notified of
the respondent's application for injunctive relief. Id. at 182.
61 Id. at 183. The Court stated that "[t]he order must be tailored as precisely as
possible to the exact needs of the case." Id. at 184.
62 Id. Specifically, the Court concluded that without the participation of the party
whose First Amendment rights are affected by the order, the possibility of devising a
narrowly drawn order is reduced to the point where First Amendment protections are
substantially imperiled. Id.
63 402 U.S. 415 (1971).

1540

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1530

community organization from peacefully distributing 64 pamphlets
containing coercive messages opposing the real estate practices of
Keefe, a local realtor. 65 Keefe was engaged in "panic peddling,"
whereby he would motivate white homeowners to sell their homes
by telling them that African-Americans were moving into the
neighborhood.6 6 He would then secure the listings and sell the
homes to African-American clients. 67 The community organization
passed out pamphlets to inform the community of Keefe's tactics
and to induce Keefe to sign an agreement not to continue such
methods.6 8 The Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the injunction
prohibiting the community organization's protests because the
court found the organization's conduct to be coercive rather than
informative.6 9
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted that it has
historically recognized the peaceful dissemination of pamphlets as
speech deserving of First Amendment protection.7 ° The Court
found that the intention to influence Keefe's conduct through the
coercive result of the organization's pamphlets did not remove the
speech from First Amendment protection.71 The organization, the
Supreme Court asserted, simply was informing the public of
Keefe's practices.72 Thus, the Court held that as long as the means
are peaceful, the method of expression need not meet the public's
acceptance. 73
64 Id. at 417. The trial court found that the circulation of the pamphlets was
peaceful and orderly, disrupted no traffic, and led to no fights or other disturbances
of the peace. Id.
65 Id. at 416-17, 420.
66 Id. at 416.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 417. One leaflet displayed Keefe's business card reading, "I only sell to

Negroes." Id. Another leaflet stated that the organization would stop pamphleteering in Keefe's hometown of Westchester, Illinois once Keefe signed the "no solicitation" agreement. Id. A third urged recipients to call Keefe at his home and

encourage him to sign the no solicitation agreement. Id.
69 Id. at 418. The appellate court concluded that public policy favored "protection
of the privacy of the home and family from encroachment of the nature of petitioners' activities." Id.
70 Id. at 419 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,143 (1943); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938)).
71 Id. (citations omitted). The Court analogized the organization's intention to
influence Keefe's actions to that of a newspaper's function of influencing societal
actions through its publication Id. (citations omitted).
72 Id. The Court noted that as long as petitioners' means were peaceful, the communication did not otherwise need to meet standards of acceptability. Id.
73 Id. The Court reasoned that while the organization's message was offensive to
Keefe and others, Keefe's tactics similarly were offensive to the organization. Id. The
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The next year, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of locality with regard to First Amendment expressive conduct in
Grayned v. City of Rockford.7 1 In Grayned, the Court upheld an antinoise ordinance,7 5 but struck down an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school.76 Defendant Grayned was arrested for his participation in a demonstration outside of a
Rockford, Illinois high school protesting the unequal treatment of
black students and faculty at the school. 7 The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld both ordinances, 7 but the United States Supreme
Court disagreed, ruling that the anti-picketing ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 Turning to the second provision,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the anti-noise ordinance was
constitutional because it was neither vague 80 nor overbroad"' and
Court also mentioned that no prior case had allowed a person, through the use of
injunctive relief prohibiting pamphleteering, to escape public condemnation of his
business methods. Id.
74 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
75 Id. at 108, 120. The ordinance prohibited anyone present on land adjacent to a
school in session from wilfully creating a noise or diversion that disrupts or tends to
disrupt the peace or order of the school. Id. at 107-08 (quotation omitted).
76 Id. at 107 (quotation & citation omitted). A subsection of the anti-picketing
ordinance made it a disorderly conduct offense to picket or demonstrate on public
property within 150 feet of a school in session and a half-hour before or after school
hours. Id. (quotation omitted). The subsection did not prohibit picketing at a school
implicated in a labor dispute. Id. (quotation omitted).
77 Id. at 105.
78 City of Rockford v. Grayned, 263 N.E.2d 866, 867, 868, 869 (Ill. 1970), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
79 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107 (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02
(1972)). The Court followed the holding in Police Department v. Mosley in concluding
that a blanket ban on picketing prohibited more expressive communication than necessary. Id. (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101-02).
80 Id. at 109. The Court recognized the importance of an ordinance's clarity
where First Amendment rights are concerned because vague laws do not provide a
warning and may therefore trap the uninformed or inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms due to fear of violating an unclear law. Id. at 108-09 (citations
omitted). The Court found that the anti-noise ordinance was not vague because it
clearly stated that it was applicable only in the school context. Id. at 112. Thus, the
majority determined that the ordinance gave fair notice that disturbances would be
measured by their effect on regular school activities. Id. The Court distinguished
such an ordinance from a common "breach of the peace" ordinance, which would
leave too much discretion in the hands of police and judges to determine what actions violate the ordinance. Id. at 113, 114 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 57475 (1965)) (other citations omitted). This kind of subjective determination of what
activity violates the ordinance, the Court asserted, would open the door for people to
be punished for voicing unpopular views. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
81 Id. at 114-15. The Court noted that even an ordinance that is not vague cannot
be constitutional if its scope is so broad that it also reaches constitutionally-protected
conduct. Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
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was narrowly tailored to achieve the government's compelling interest in having an undisturbed school session to promote student
learning.

82

In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,8" the Supreme Court addressed an injunction that prohibited the NAACP from boycotting
white businesses." The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the injunction, finding the boycott unlawful partly based on the supreme
court's findings that fear of retaliation influenced many AfricanAmerican citizens to join the boycott.8 5 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court noted that the First Amendment does not
protect violent conduct or threats of violent conduct. 86 When such
actions occur during constitutionally-protected activity, the Court
asserted, "precision of regulation" is necessary. 87 The Court determined that although the NAACP's non-violent political activities
82 Id. at 119. The Supreme Court stated that the nature of a location dictates the
reasonableness of a time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 116. Freedom of
speech, the Court indicated, deserves broad latitude in the school context because
expression is essential to the educational process. Id. at 117 (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 512 (1969)). The Court,
noting that a silent vigil would be reasonable in a public library, articulated that making a speech in the same library would not be reasonable and, thus, would be subject
to regulation. Id. at 116 (citation omitted). The general rule for determining the
reasonableness of a regulation, the Court stated, is whether the manner of presentation is compatible with the ordinary activity of a specific place at a specific time. Id.
Following this rule, the Court found that the ordinance in Graynedwas not unconstitutional because it punished only conduct that was disruptive or potentially disruptive to
ordinary school activities. Id. at 119.
8- 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
84 Id. at 889, 893. The NAACP instituted the boycott after white officials failed to
respond adequately to a list of demands presented by black citizens seeking racial
equality and integration. Id. at 889. The trial court ordered a broad injunction
prohibiting the petitioners from stationing "store watchers," persuading others from
patronizing businesses, using obscene and demeaning language, picketing, using violence, and damaging property. Id. at 893.
85 Id. at 894-95 (quotations omitted). Names of persons who disregarded the boycott were announced at Claiborne County NAACP meetings and published in a newspaper called Black Times. Id. at 903-04. Some NAACP members then called the
designated persons demeaning names, rejected them socially, and deemed them betrayers of the black cause. Id. at 904 (quotation omitted). There were also incidents
of violence: shots were twice fired into a home; a brick was hurled through a windshield; and a garden was damaged. Id.
86 Id. at 916. The Court noted that a state is not restricted from imposing tort
liability where business losses result from violent conduct or threats of violence. Id.
The Court, however, qualified this statement by asserting that "precision regulation"
is required when the conduct occurs within the context of activities protected by the
Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Court advised, where an activity is
entitled to First Amendment protection, the Constitution imposes restraints on the
basis upon which, and the individuals upon whom, damages liability may be
grounded. Id. at 916-17.
87 Id. at 916.
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were deserving of full First Amendment protection, the Mississippi
Supreme Court's findings of possible ostracism were inadequate to
allow the injunction to meet the "precision of regulation" standard
88
required by the First Amendment.
With this background of case law, the Supreme Court, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., confronted the First Amendment
freedom of speech issue with the controversial abortion debate
looming in the backdrop. 89 The Madsen Court addressed the constitutionality of an injunction that restricted the areas and methods
of anti-abortion demonstrations at an abortion clinic.9" The Court
held that a thirty-six-foot buffer zone surrounding the clinic's entrances and a limited noise restriction were constitutional. 9 1 The
Court, however, rejected as unconstitutional a thirty-six-foot buffer
zone as it applied to the sides of the clinic, an "images observable"
prohibition, a 300-foot no approach without consent zone, and a
300-foot buffer zone around staff residences.9 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first assessed
the protestors' claim that the injunction necessarily was contentbased because it effectively restricted only anti-abortion speech.9 3
To accept this claim, the Court explained, would render every injunction content-based because an injunction, by its nature, is directed toward a particular group creating the conflict.9 4 The Court
reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that the Florida
courts would not have restrained equally similar protest demonstrations targeting issues other than abortion.9 5
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the rule for determining the content neutrality of speech regulation requires a
consideration of whether the regulation refers to the content of
the restricted speech.9 6 The Court determined that the broadened
injunction at issue in this case was without reference to anti-abor88

Id. at 915, 921.

89 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
90 Id.

Id. at 2527, 2528.
Id. at 2528, 2529, 2530.
93 Id. at 2523.
94 Id. The Court submitted that injunctions are created in terms of a group's past
actions concerning a specific issue. Id. The Court commented that injunctions are
thus drafted to protect the rights of one party and are tailored to remedy a specific
situation. Id. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist proffered, a court faced with an action
seeking injunctive relief is charged with creating a remedy that targets a specific deprivation of rights, and not with formulating a statute of general application. Id.
95 Id. The Court noted that the injunction did not address pro-choice demonstrations because there were no such demonstrations occurring at the clinic. Id.
96 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (other
91
92
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ion speech, and thus content-neutral.9 7 The motivation for this
injunction, the majority posited, was the conduct of the group in
violation of the initial injunction.9 8 The fact that all those arrested
shared the same anti-abortion viewpoint, the ChiefJustice asserted,
did not in itself make the injunction content-based. 99
Having concluded that the injunction was content-neutral, the
majority noted that strict scrutiny review was thus inapplicable. °°
In determining the appropriate level of review, the majority was
wary of applying the mid-level review traditionally employed for
content-neutral "time, place, and manner" regulations.'
The
Supreme Court cited its reason by distinguishing between an injunction and a generally applicable statute." 2 The Court noted
that generally applicable statutes are legislatively-produced and
therefore represent the advancement of societal interests. 10 3 Injunctions, on the other hand, the Court noted, are judicially-produced to remedy violations of legislative decrees and are more
susceptible to censorship and discrimination." 4 The Court was
concerned that mid-level review would not be sufficiently rigorous
for analyzing injunctions due to that remedy's vulnerability to
abuse.'0 5 The majority decided that the appropriate scrutiny for
citations omitted). The threshold consideration, the Court noted, is the government's purpose in creating the regulation. Id.
97 Id. at 2523-24. ChiefJustice Rehnquist explained that the injunction in Madsen
was not rendered content-based merely because the injunction affected individuals
who shared a particular viewpoint. Id. at 2524. That the protestors shared the same
point of view as to the abortion issue, the Chief Justice stated, did not demonstrate
that a content-based purpose motivated the order. Id. (citation omitted). Rather, the
Court determined, the fact of the protestors' common viewpoint suggested only "that
those in the group whose conduct violated the court's order happen [ed] to share the
same opinion regarding abortions being performed at the clinic." Id.
98

Id.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
101 Id. at 2524-25. The Court noted that the injunction in this case restricted
speech in a "traditional public forum," thus invoking the requirement that time,
place, and manner restrictions be "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.'" Id. at 2524 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)) (other citations omitted). The Supreme Court, however, noted that this standard had applied traditionally to ordinances of general application. See id. Examining the differences between an injunction and an ordinance, the Court concluded
that injunctions require a "more stringent application of First Amendment principles." Id. (citations omitted).
99
100

102
103

Id.
Id.

Id. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
Id. at 2524, 2525 (citations omitted). The Court noted that the balance between
the goal of the injunction and the constraint placed upon speech previously has been
104
105
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this content-neutral injunction was to determine whether the provisions of the injunction burdened no more speech than required
to achieve a significant government interest. 06
With the standard of review established, the Court affirmed
the Florida Supreme Court's finding that there was a significant
government interest at issue in this case.1"7 A combination of concerns, the Court agreed, adequately created this interest.' 8 The
majority identified the significant government interests as: protecting the freedom of a woman to pursue lawful medical assistance or
counseling services with regard to her pregnancy; 10 9 securing public safety and order; ensuring the free flow of traffic; preserving the
property rights of all citizens; and assuring medical privacy
rights.110 The Supreme Court then embarked upon an analysis of
each contested provision to determine whether any provision burdened more speech than necessary to achieve its objective. 1 '
The ChiefJustice first examined the thirty-six-foot buffer zone
around the clinic's entrances and driveway, 1 I determining that the
zone did not burden any more speech than necessary to effectuate
the state's interest."' While the Supreme Court admitted that allowing the protestors to be on the sidewalk and driveway subject to
certain restrictions would be less intrusive, the Court recalled that
the first injunction attempted such action and proved unsuccessful. 14 The majority indicated that there were no alternatives that
would insure an unimpeded entrance and exit from the clinic." 5
the focus of the Court's attention. Id. at 2524-25 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912, 913 (1982); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977); Milk Wagon
Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 295, 296 (1941))
(other citation omitted).
106 Id. (citations omitted).
107 Id. at 2526.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973); In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,

1190, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
110 Id. The Supreme Court previously acknowledged a strong state interest in residential privacy, which the Court believed applied analogously to a patient's interest in
medical privacy. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)) (other citation
omitted).
111 Id.
112 Id. The majority noted that the provision prohibited protestors from "'congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering'" within 36 feet of the clinic
property line or on any part of the public right-of-way. Id.
113 Id. at 2527.
114 Id.
115 Id. The Chief Justice mentioned that the road was only 21 feet wide near the
clinic. Id. (citation omitted). Allowing protestors to remain near the clinic entrance
or on the road, the Court noted, obviously would obstruct vehicular traffic. Id.
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Even with the thirty-six-foot buffer zone, the Court noted, protestors could still remain ten to twelve feet from vehicles approaching
and exiting the clinic." 6 The Supreme Court concluded that this
was an adequate distance from which protestors could communi1 17
cate their anti-abortion message.
Chief Justice Rehnquist next found that the creation of the
thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the private property to the west
and north of the clinic was unconstitutional." 8 The majority based
its finding on the fact that there was no evidence in the record that
the protestors' conduct in these areas obstructed access to the
clinic, unlawfully disrupted the clinic's business, or hindered traffic
near the clinic.' 1 9 Patients and clinic staff, the Court noted, did
not need to cross these areas to reach the clinic. 2 ' Thus, the majority concluded, a complete ban on the protestors' presence in
these areas would burden more speech than necessary to achieve
the government's objective of protecting access to the clinic. 2 '
The Court then addressed the injunction's limited noise restrictions and found that they adequately ensured the well-being of
patients and burdened no more speech than necessary in fulfilling
this governmental interest. 2 The majority reasoned that it was
necessary to take into consideration the location at issue when
weighing the burden of the restrictions on free speech.'
Chief
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Supreme Court previously had
sustained a similar noise restriction aimed at protestors around a
public school because of the importance of a quiet atmosphere
near the school. 1 24 The majority reasoned that, for the purposes of
the present case, limiting noise around a medical facility is similarly
important to protect patients during surgery and periods of
Id. (citation omitted).
117 See id. The Chief Justice noted that protestors, while standing across the street,
could be heard and seen from the clinic's parking lots. Id.
118 Id. at 2528. The Court mentioned that the area west and north of the clinic
constituted the side and rear of the clinic. Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
116

121 Id.
122 Id. The provision restricted the protestors from "'singing, chanting, whistling,
shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or
other sounds... within earshot of the patients inside the [c]linic' during the hours of
7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays." Id. The significant government objective for this provision, the Court asserted, was the assurance of health and
well-being for those being treated at the clinic. Id. (quotation omitted).
123 Id.
124 Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 120 (1972)). The
Grayned Court upheld the noise restrictions around a school after exploring the nature and usual activities of the school setting. Grayned 408 U.S. at 116, 120.
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2 5

recuperation.1
In contrast to the noise restriction clause, the Court determined that the "'images observable'" clause of the same provision
did not pass constitutional muster. 1 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that ensuring patients' well-being and stopping threats to
patients were two possible governmental interests involved in this
case.12 7 The majority stated, however, that a ban on observable
images burdened more speech than necessary to protect patients'
health because the clinic easily could close the curtains, thus insulating the patients from this kind of expression.1 28 The Court added that the ban constituted overly burdensome regulation
because the provision, in an attempt to achieve the government's
129
end, banned more than images conveying threatening messages.
The Court rejected the injunction's 300-foot no approach
zone requirement because the provision was broader than necessary to achieve the government objective of maintaining access to
the clinic and to protect a person's right to be left alone. 3 The
Court maintained that such a comprehensive ban on speech only
could be upheld if the speech constituted fighting words or
threats. 131 Otherwise, the Court asserted, First Amendment freethat citizens tolerate outrageous, and even
dom of speech requires
132
offensive, speech.
125 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. The Court previously announced the importance of
quiet at a hospital due to the daily emotional and physical strain that patients endure.
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 (1979)). In upholding the constitutionality of the Madsen provision, ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that
the First Amendment does not require that patients at a hospital shoulder extensive
efforts to avoid the onslaught of political protests. Id.
126
127
128

Id. at 2528-29.

Id. at 2529.
Id. The majority made this argument in response to the clinic's claim that signs,
as well as noise, increased the anxiety level of patients, creating greater medical risks.
Id. at 2521. The Chief Justice noted that the clinic more easily could obstruct patients' views than patients' hearing, emphasizing the difference between this clause
and the limited noise restrictions. Id. at 2529.
129 Id.
130 Id. The majority explained that the provision banned protestors from physically
approaching any potential patients within 300 feet of the clinic, unless the potential
patient consented to such communication. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist commented
that the provision was drafted to restrict "stalking" or "shadowing" of the patients as
they approached the facility. Id. (citing International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.Ct. 2711, 2721 (1992) (reporting that solicitors will often seek
out the vulnerable)).
131 Id. (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.
312 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1941)).
132 Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)); see also Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting proposed outrageousness standard
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Finally, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the provision creating a 300-foot buffer zone around the homes of clinic
staff.13 The ChiefJustice condemned the provision, noting that it
placed a burden on more speech than was necessary to protect the
privacy of one's home.1 3 4 The majority expounded that the provision could have achieved its objective by simply limiting the
amount of noise, the number of protestors, or the duration of protests, rather than banning all protests in the area.1 3 5 The Court
distinguished this provision from the buffer zone allowed in Frisby
v. Schultz' 3 6 because the ordinance in that case only prohibited
demonstrations in front of a particular individual's home.1 37 The
restriction on speech created by the buffer zone, the majority ar3 8
ticulated, was too broad to remain constitutional.1
The Court rejected the protestors' general assertion that the
injunction was vague and overbroad because the injunction also
applied to those acting "in concert" with protesters.13 9 The majority found that the protestors, as parties to the suit, had no standing
to challenge the vagueness of the "in concert" clause because it
applied to those who were not parties to the suit. 4 ° The clause,
the Supreme Court further instructed, was not subject to an overbreadth contention because it did not forbid any specific condue to its inherent subjectivity, which contradicts the Court's prohibition against punishing speech that may have an unfavorable emotional effect on the audience).
133 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. The provision prevented "picketing, demonstrating,
or using sound amplification equipment" in a 300-foot zone around the residence of
any clinic staff member. Id.
134 Id. at 2529-30.
135

Id. at 2530.

136

487 U.S. 474 (1988).

137 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477, 483). In Frisby, the

Court upheld a municipal ordinance that banned picketing "'before or about the
residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.'" Frisby, 487 U.S. at
477 (quotation omitted). The Court found that this ordinance was content-neutral
because the picketing was restricted without regard to the content of the speech. Id.
at 482. As a content-neutral regulation, the Court applied intermediate level scrutiny
and found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to achieve the significant governmental goal of protecting the privacy of the home. Id. at 482, 483, 484 (citation omitted). The Court made this determination because the ordinance focused only on
picketing centered on a particular residence and left open ample alternative channels
through which protestors could disseminate their message. Id. at 483, 484.
138 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. The Court noted that because the provision also
prohibited protestors from impeding access to roadways that provide sole access to
residences, protestors were forbidden to engage in "'[g] eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or... walking a route in front of an entire block of houses."'
Id. (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483) (alteration in original).
139
140

Id.

Id.
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duct. 14 1 The Court also repudiated the protestors' contention that
the injunction obstructed their First Amendment freedom of association.1 4 2 The Chief Justice explained that while the injunction
did not stop the protestors from congregating with others to communicate a viewpoint, the First Amendment does not authorize
anyone to unite with a group to divest others of their rights. 143 Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in
part, the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.1 "
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter agreed with the
Court's analysis, but wrote to elucidate two matters. 145 First, the
Justice clarified that the trial judge stated that those acting "in concert" would not be defined by their political viewpoints, but the
issue would instead be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 146 Next, the
Justice noted that the protestors conceded that the stated govern1 47
mental interests were disclosed in applicable Florida law.
Justice Stevens authored an opinion concurring in part with
and dissenting in part from the majority's opinion.1 48 The Justice
agreed with the Court's finding that the injunction was not content-based.1 49 The Justice also conceded that it was constitutionally
permissible to apply the injunction to those acting in concert.1 50
Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with the standard of review that
the Court adopted, reasoning that courts should evaluate injunctions more leniently than legislation. 5 1 The Justice also opposed
141 Id. The Court announced that this situation was controlled by Regal Knitwear Co.
v.NLRB. Id. (citing Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14, 16 (1945)). In Regal
Knitwear, the National Labor Relations Board issued a cease and desist order pertaining to "'officers, agents, successors and assigns.'" Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 10. Noting that the petitioners were neither successors nor assigns, the Court held that
petitioners failed to bring a proper appeal because the provision did not affect their
obligations or conduct. See id. at 16.
142 Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2530 (citation omitted). The freedom of association emanates from the First Amendment's express right of assembly, which necessarily implies
a right of group action. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 784. Courts have interpreted the First Amendment to extend this freedom to collective action with expressive content. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982)
(recognizing group boycotts as protected by the First Amendment)).
143 Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2530.
144 Id.
145 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
146 Id. (citation omitted).
147 Id. at 2530-31 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149 Id. (quoting id. at 2523-24).
150 Id. (quoting id. at 2530).
151 Id. The Justice reasoned that legislation is subject to heightened scrutiny because it affects an entire community, while an injunction is tailored to a specific group
engaging in illegal conduct. Id. Justice Stevens argued for lenient treatment of in-
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clinic,
the rejection of the 300-foot no approach zone around the
15 2
broadly.
too
provision
the
read
majority
the
that
finding
Justice Scalia drafted an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. 5
Justice Scalia speculated that the Court, contrary to established jurisprudence, permitted some provisions while disallowing others in
an effort to appease both sides of the sensitive abortion issue.15 4
junctions by charging that the propriety of an injunction depends entirely on the
kind of activity prohibited and the probability of its recurrence. Id.
152 Id. at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens attacked the Court's interpretation that paragraph five of the injunction meant
that the "300-foot no approach without consent zone" prohibited speech by the
protestors. Id. Paragraph five of the injunction read:
'At all times on all days, in an area within three-hundred (300) feet of
the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the services
of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by
approaching or by inquiring of the [petitioners]. In the event of such
invitation, the [petitioners] may engage in communications consisting
of conversation of a non-threatening nature and by the delivery of literature within the three-hundred (300) foot area but in no event within
the 36 foot buffer zone. Should any individual decline such communication, otherwise known as "sidewalk counseling", that person shall have
the absolute right to leave or walk away and the [petitioners] shall not
accompany such person, encircle, surround, harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who choose not to communicate with them.'
Id. at 2532 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation
omitted) (alteration in original).
Advocating a stricter reading of paragraph five, Justice Stevens interpreted that
paragraph to mean that so long as the protestors did not partake in the expressly
prohibited conduct, they were free to communicate with approaching patients
through "'sidewalk counseling"'. Id. at 2532 & n.4 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens reasoned that while the First Amendment protects
the protestors' right to communicate their message through sidewalk counseling, the
First Amendment in no way gives protestors the right to harass a captive audience,
especially those seeking medical treatment. Id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972)). The Justice further urged that one has the right to communicate even a
vulgar message to unwilling viewers. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22
(1971)). As such, Justice Stevens concluded that the 300-foot no approach zone burdened no more speech than necessary to ensure patients' safety and, therefore, survived First Amendment scrutiny. Id.
Justice Stevens indicated that the majority went beyond the pertinent issues in
appraising the constitutionality of the 36-foot buffer zone, noise restrictions, and
images observable provisions. Id. at 2533-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens expressed agreement with the Court's analysis of the
noise and images issues, but reiterated that the issues did not apply to the Court's
grant of certiorari. Id. at 2534 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154 Id. ("The entire injunction in this case departs so far from the established
course of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as
a candidate for summary reversal. But the context here is abortion.").
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previous holdings required
Justice Scalia posited that the Court's 155
that the entire injunction be rejected.

To strengthen this argument, Justice Scalia discussed a videotape presented in the record presumably displaying the worst of
the protestors' conduct.1 56 The Justice noted that the tape depicted both pro-abortion and anti-abortion activists making noise
and displaying signs near the clinic.1 57 Justice Scalia argued that
the tape showed no effort by the protestors to stop or even delay
traffic near the clinic entrance. 5 The Justice also observed that
the tape did not display the slightest violent conduct.1 59
Justice Scalia propounded that a community sidewalk is a public forum to which the Court generally extends First Amendment
protection. 6 ° The Justice then noted that the Court rejected both
the protestors' request for strict scrutiny review 161 and the respondents' desire for intermediate scrutiny review, 162 and created its
own standard.1 63 Justice Scalia suggested that, contrary to the
Court's belief, there is no discernible difference between the
Court's standard and intermediate scrutiny." Justice Scalia argued that intermediate scrutiny is not sufficient for cases involving
injunctions because of their special nature.1 65 Justice Scalia asId.
Id. at 2535-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2535-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 2536 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia mentioned that the tape displayed a traffic delay of approximately ten seconds,
which was merely the amount of time for the protestors to get out of the way of the
entering vehicles. Id.
159 Id. Justice Scalia submitted that there was not any 'jostling or physical contact"
between the adversarial parties. Id.
160 Id. at 2537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
161 Id. (quotation omitted). The Justice noted that strict scrutiny generally is applied to content-based restrictions. See id. (quotation omitted).
162 Id. (citation omitted). The Justice mentioned that intermediate scrutiny generally permits time, place, and manner regulations that are content-neutral, narrowly
drawn to achieve a significant state interest, and leave open alternative channels of
communication. Id. at 2537-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quotation omitted).
163 Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at
2524, 2525).
164 Id. Justice Scalia commented that the Court purported to apply a standard between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Id. (quoting id. at 2524, 2525).
165 Id. at 2538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia asserted that an injunction by its nature lends itself to the suppression of specific ideas: while the injunction does not profess to limit speech, a judge necessarily
will be aware of certain expression that the injunction will limit. Id. at 2538 (ScaliaJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, the Justice reasoned that
injunctions are issued by individual judges who may be angered by failure to comply
155
156
157
158
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an injunction strict scrutiny,
serted that the Court should afford
1 66
not.
or
content-based
whether
Justice Scalia next expressed disagreement with the Court's
1 67
finding that the injunction in this case was not content-based.
The Justice noted that the "in concert" provision of the injunction
necessarily affected only anti-abortion activists. 168 Justice Scalia relied on testimony by those arrested and presented at trial who
stated that selection for arrest was based upon an individual's antiabortion position. 6 9
Justice Scalia argued that injunctions are classic illustrations of
prior restraints, to which the Court has attached a strong presumption against constitutionality. 17' The Justice underscored that in
previous speech-restricting injunction cases, the Court required a
compelling state need and "'precision of regulation,"' which is
equivalent to strict scrutiny. 17 1 Even where violent conduct is pres172
Jusent, Justice Scalia professed, strict scrutiny is still required.

tice Scalia identified the lack of support for the majority's standard
with their original orders. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Justice propounded that free speech rights should not be left to the discretion of a single individual. Id. Justice Scalia further noted that injunctions are much
more powerful than statutes and, thus, courts should apply the strictest scrutiny to
injunctions. Id.
166 Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
noted that what makes content-based legislation deserving of strict scrutiny is that
such legislation lends itself to being used for invidious purposes. Id. at 2539 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because injunctions often result in
unavoidable "targeting," the Justice proffered, speech-restricting injunctions similarly
may be used for invidious purposes. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2539-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotations
omitted). These colloquies, Justice Scalia noted, suggested that pro-choice activists
were also demonstrating at the same location, but were not arrested. See id. Justice
Scalia remarked that the injunction was therefore tailored to control persons based
upon their views, rather than their conduct. Id.
170 Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation &
citations omitted). Justice Scalia mentioned that the Supreme Court historically has
rejected speech-restricting injunctions. Id. (citations omitted).
171 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982))
(other citation omitted).
172 Id. (citation omitted). The Justice provided that in Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,
the Supreme Court struck down a provision prohibiting all picketing where there was
evidence of only scattered violence because the complaining party did not prove that
violence would recur if picketing continued. Id. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139-40
(1957)). Justice Scalia explained that the only reason the Court allowed the injunction banning picketing in Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
was because that case involved pervasive violence and coercion surrounding the picketing. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Milk
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of review, explaining that the two cases upon which the majority
relied actually advocate the application of strict scrutiny. 17 3
Justice Scalia further argued that even under the Court's lenient standard, the provisions allowed by the majority should not
stand.1 74 In questioning the state's significant interest in the free
flow of traffic, Justice Scalia suggested that an injunction is proper
only when it is in response to an imminent or actual violation of
law and when there is a danger of repeated violation.175 Justice
Scalia maintained that the majority's allowance of an injunction to
promote the free flow of traffic absent a violation of any law that
furthers that interest was in error. 176 To demonstrate the absence
of a violation of law, Justice Scalia pointed to evidence on the record that showed that at worst, the protestors caused a momentary
77
delay as they cleared the way for cars entering the parking lot.1
Justice Scalia then claimed that even if the Court had established a significant interest, the thirty-six-foot buffer zone burdened more speech than was necessary to achieve this interest
because less drastic alternatives were available.1 71 Justice Scalia
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294, 295,
296, 299 (1941)).
173 Id. The Justice narrated that the Court relied upon Carroll and ClaiborneHardware to support the validity of its new standard. Id. (citing ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S.
at 921; Carrol v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968)).Justice Scalia
cited Carroll as requiring a First Amendment regulation to be "'couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order."' Id. (quoting Carroll, 393
U.S. at 183). Justice Scalia concluded that the above standard is equivalent to strict
scrutiny and not nearly as lenient as the Madsen Court's new standard. Id.
Justice Scalia next explained that in ClaiborneHardware,where there was evidence
of scattered violence, the Court still required "surgical precision of regulation" because while the First Amendment does not protect violent conduct, the strict scrutiny
standard must still be used when the violence occurs in the setting of a constitutionally-protected activity. Id. at 2543 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S at 916).
174 Id. at 2544 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175 Id. (citations omitted).
176 Id. The Justice related that the original injunction was issued as a response to
protestors' threats to block passage to and shut down the clinic. Id. (quotation omitted). Justice Scalia then argued that the Court was remiss in blindly accepting the
lower court's finding that the previous injunction was violated repeatedly. Id. at 2545
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 2524).
177 Id. at 2545-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation
omitted). Justice Scalia professed that the courts below did not find that the protestors intentionally interfered with access to the clinic and, therefore, the protestors
had not violated the previous injunction. Id. at 2546 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Without such a finding, Justice Scalia concluded, there was
no violation of a state law protecting a significant government interest. Id.
178 Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice
asserted that there were ample alternatives: the court could have banned petitioners
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noted that the Court accepted the state court's opinion that because the first injunction failed, these less drastic alternatives necessarily would fail as well.1 79 Justice Scalia posited that by
circumventing its own stated standard and relying on the opinion
of a lower court, the Court, in essence, formulated a new standard:
the remedy must "'arguably burden no more speech than is necessary.' ' 8 The Justice commented that such a standard is even
more lenient than the intermediate scrutiny adopted by the Court

and inappropriate for a restraint on speech."'
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the Court's argument that,
because the protestors would still be only ten to twelve feet from
the approaching cars, the buffer zone was acceptable. 182 Justice
Scalia instructed that such an alternative forum argument is a classic intermediate review of a time, place, and manner restriction."'
Justice Scalia noted that such an argument is misplaced because
the injunction at issue in this case was not directed at all citizens.1 8 4

Thus, the Justice asserted, these petitioners have the right to protest in the same places as all other Floridians, not merely at some

reasonably effective location.18 5 Justice Scalia concluded that such
an alternative forum argument did not excuse an impermissible

prior restraint.1 8 6
In the Court's opinion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist addressedJusfrom the street, limited the number of protestors, and banned the protestors from
picketing on the driveways. Id.
179 Id. (quoting id.
at 2527).
180 Id. at 2549 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
181 Id.
182 Id. (quotation omitted).
183 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). Justice
Scalia noted that the time, place, and manner regulation at issue in Ward applied to
all citizens. Id.
184
185

Id.
Id.

186 Id. (quotation omitted). Justice Scalia warned that the Court's decision in this
case could cause future problems. Id. The Justice mentioned that courts will cite the
case in the future as a "free-speech injunction case," rather than as an abortion rights
case. Id. As such, Justice Scalia remarked, the Court allowed an injunction against
speech to be addressed by the intermediate scrutiny previously applied to time, place,
and manner regulations. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the Court allowed an injunction that is not linked closely to a violation of the law because the injunction supported sound social policy. Id. at 2549-50 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Scalia also underscored that the Court affirmed the practice of permitting trial court conclusions that allow injunctions without contemplating whether
those decisions are supported by the findings of fact. Id. at 2550 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tice Scalia's disagreement with the chosen standard of review. 187
The majority attacked Justice Scalia's argument that content-neutral legislation is as worthy as content-based legislation for strict
scrutiny, noting that the Justice could not cite one case in which
the Court applied strict scrutiny to a content-neutral injunction.1 81

The Court proceeded to criticize Justice Scalia's dissent by stating
that the Justice misread NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.18 9 The
Court concluded that the standard of review that it adopted for this

case met the "precision of regulation" requirement adopted in
Claiborne Hardware, and rejected Justice Scalia's interpretation of

the term as "surgical precision of regulation" that could be
achieved only by strict scrutiny. 190 The majority also addressed Justice Scalia's argument that Carroll v. President of Princess Anne required stricter scrutiny than that adopted by the Court in the
present case. 191 Noting that Carrollrequired that the injunction be
framed in the narrowest terms necessary to accomplish the specific
objective,1 92 the Court did not discern a difference between the
193
Carrollrequirement and the standard adopted in this case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist then dismantled Justice Scalia's contention that the videotape of the demonstration was the worst of
the protestors' actions and did not necessitate as intrusive an injunction as the one the trial court drafted.1 9 4 The Chief Justice
argued that it was unwarranted for Justice Scalia to assume that the
videotape necessarily depicted the protestors' worst conduct without any other evidence supporting such a finding. 195 Further, the
Chief Justice professed that this appeal is a question of law regarding the provisions of the injunction, not a question of fact concernId. at 2525.
Id. The Court distinguished the cases that Justice Scalia cited as being prior
restraint cases. Id. (citing id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). The Court agreed that prior restraints on free expression do give rise to a
presumption against constitutionality, but indicated that this injunction does not create a prior restraint and, thus, strict scrutiny is not mandated. Id. (citing id. at 2524
n.2).
189 Id. at 2525-2526 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916
(1982)).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 2526.
192 Id. (quoting Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1982)).
193 Id. The Court failed to acknowledge any legitimate difference between the following language: "'couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pinpointed objective'" and "'burden no more speech than necessary' to accomplish its
objective." Id. (quoting Carrol4 393 U.S. at 183).
194 Id. at 2527.
195 Id. (quoting id. at 2535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
187
188
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ing the prayer for injunctive relief.196
Madsen v. Women's Health Center essentially presents a conflict
between the free speech right to protest and the privacy rights surrounding the abortion decision and medical counseling. The Madsen Court attempted to downplay the sensitive abortion issue by
dealing with the case as one primarily encompassing the issue of
First Amendment freedom of speech. As a result, the Court produced an inconsistent and excessively lenient approach to dealing
with the buffer zone issue. This approach may lead to confusion
and debate in future freedom of speech cases.
The Madsen Court balanced two competing rights: the fundamental right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, which is
a significant part of a woman's right to privacy, and the freedom of
speech central to the American concept of democracy.1 9 7 Following its own established guidelines, the Court should have struck
down the thirty-six-foot buffer zone, unless the Court intended to
pronounce that the right to abortion is so fundamental that it permits a complete ban on speech near facilities that provide abortion
services. 198

The Supreme Court historically has given First Amendment
protection to peaceful picketing, including expressive conduct that
is considered offensive or coercive.' 99 The right to free speech,
Id. at 2527-28 (quotation omitted).
Luke T. Cadigan, Note, Balancing the Interests: A PracticalApproach to Restrictions
on Expressive Conduct in the Anti-Abortion Protest Context, 32 B.C. L. REv. 835, 896 (1991);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. (setting forth freedom of speech rights); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term).
198 See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 658, 670, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1985), remanded, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), affd,
476 U.S. 747 (1986). In American College of Obstetricians,the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that a woman's right to abortion was compelling enough to strike down a disclosure requirement mandating abortion facilities
to disclose the names of women obtaining abortions. Id. The court found that there
was no compelling state interest in facilitating the First Amendment rights of antiabortion protesters to justify regulating abortion. Id. at 670. However, such a restriction on First Amendment rights is nowhere near the intrusiveness of a complete ban
on speech within a buffer zone. Compare id. at 658, 670, 672 (upholding a preliminary
injunction prohibiting enforcement of disclosure requirements in the abortion context) with Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526-27 (upholding the imposition of a 36-foot buffer
zone, surrounding an abortion clinic, that broadly prohibited protest activities within
its scope).
199 See Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 298 (1941) (establishing that a complete prohibition on picketing would be upheld only where violence was imminent); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105
(1940) (denying a ban on picketing during a labor dispute where there was no danger to life or property or invasion of privacy interests). The Court did allow a ban on
196
197
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however, is not absolute and may be restricted with regard to its
time, place, or manner. 2 0 The established rule for restricting protected speech, which the Madsen Court chose not to apply, is that
the regulation must be content-neutral, must be narrowly tailored
to meet a significant governmental objective, and must maintain
alternative channels of discussion. 2 1 The thirty-six-foot buffer
zone in Madsen, however, was not narrowly tailored because it restricted more speech than was necessary to achieve the stated government interest. 20 2 The anti-noise provision alone would have
stopped the protestors from affecting the patients inside the clinic
and would have reduced the stress and anxiety thrust upon patients approaching the clinic.20 3
The Supreme Court enunciated the appropriate line of reasoning previously in Grayned v. City of Rockford, where the Court
found that an anti-noise restriction near a school was narrowly taipeaceful picketing in Frisby v. Schultz, where the picketing took place in front of the
residences of specific individuals. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1988)
("[B]ecause of [the ordinance's] narrow scope, the facial challenge to the ordinance
must fail."). The Court permitted the prohibition after considering the importance
of a person's right to privacy within her home. Id. at 477, 484; see also supra note 6
(setting forth other physical boundaries that identify privacy interests deserving of
protection).
200 Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) (citations omitted).
201 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
202 See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[T]here are surely a number of ways to protect those interests short of banishing the entire protest demonstration from the 36-foot zone."). The real government interest at issue here is a woman's right to an abortion. See id. at 2549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What we have decided today seems to be
... an abortion case."). The Madsen majority, however, attempted to downplay the
issue by listing less controversial interests, such as fostering the free circulation of
traffic. Id. at 2526. Such interests, however, easily could have been secured through
municipal ordinances rather than a total ban on speech specified in the injunction.
See id. at 2530-31 (citations omitted) (noting that the Madsen injunction prohibited
activities addressed in state laws prohibiting the obstruction of public streets and promoting public peace).
203 People picketing quietly or civilly engaging an approaching patient would not
create any additional anxiety or stress to the patient, and protestors First Amendment
rights would be less affected because protestors still would be allowed to communicate
their message near the clinics to approaching patients. See id. at 2521 (describing
physician's testimony that the noise generated by the protestors-from chanting to
the use of bullhorns-particularly was harmful to the well-being of the clinic's patients). It is important to remember that the core guarantee of the First Amendment
freedom of speech is the right to communicate one's message, not the right to abuse,
harass, or blast a message into an unreceptive party's ears. See supra note 6 (describing circumstances where listeners' privacy rights are more important than speakers'
First Amendment rights).
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lored to meet the state's interest in promoting education. °4 The
Grayned Court, however, noted that a buffer zone prohibiting nondisruptive picketing near a school would not be narrowly tailored
because it would restrict more speech than necessary to achieve the
promotion of education. 20 5 Following the guidelines established in
Grayned, the Madsen Court similarly should have found that while
the anti-noise provision was narrowly tailored, the thirty-six-foot
buffer zone was unconstitutional. The only justifiable reason for
upholding the thirty-six-foot buffer zone is grounded in a finding
that the right to abortion necessitates a complete ban on speech
near clinics.20 6
The Madsen Court apparently agreed that the Grayned approach is appropriate because the Court applied similar reasoning
in striking down the 300-foot buffer zone provision prohibiting
picketing near staff residences. 2 7 The Court found that the right
to privacy within a person's home, in this case, did not compel the
extensive intrusion on First Amendment speech associated with a
complete ban. 20 8 The Court determined that less restrictive means
could achieve equally the state's significant interest in maintaining
the privacy within an individual's home while allowing protestors
204 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118-120 (1972). The Court balanced
the two interests and determined that the promotion of education was more important than the right to express an opinion by any means. Id.
205 Id. at 119. The Grayned Court weighed protestors' First Amendment rights
against the state's right to promote education, determining the extent to which interest right should restrict First Amendment speech. Id. The Court determined that
alternatives such as the anti-noise ordinance could achieve the government's interest
in promoting education without intruding into protected speech as far as a buffer
zone around schools. Id. The Court has allowed complete bans on picketing only
where there was evidence of prevalent violence or where an individual's right to privacy within his home was invaded. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (recognizing that a listener's home is a boundary where
speakers' First Amendment rights are restricted greatly); Milk Wagon Driver's Union,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941) (holding that a
blanket prohibition against picketing is permissible where a threat of imminent violence is established). Clearly, neither of those two situations are present in the case at
hand. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 (stating that the injunction addressed protest
activities outside of an abortion clinic); id. at 2536 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the protests involved no violence or threats of
violence).
206 Cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 486 (1988) (establishing the right to
privacy within one's home as possibly necessitating a complete ban on First Amendment speech near a targeted person's home). The Madsen Court differentiated the
impermissible 300-foot buffer zone in that case from the permissible Frisby buffer zone
by noting that the Frisby buffer zone prohibited picketing only near the home of a
single targeted person. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quotations omitted).
207 See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
208

Id.
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to disseminate their message near the home. °9
The Court's decision to allow the thirty-six-foot buffer zone is

therefore inconsistent with the guidelines the Court previously has
asserted. Presumably, the Court did not follow this reasoning
when it addressed the thirty-six-foot buffer zone because the abor-

tion issue is such a sensitive political issue. If the Court, however,
was not willing to declare that the right to abortion has the same

force as the right to privacy in one's home with regard to the prohibition of First Amendment speech, then the Court should have
struck down the thirty-six-foot buffer zone based on the Court's
previous decisions. Instead, the Court's holding in Madsen is inconsistent with prior law, confusing the question of when First

Amendment speech may be prohibited completely. This will no
doubt lead to future problems concerning what other kinds of facilities compel the use of speech-restricting buffer zones and ex-

actly how far a buffer zone may extend before intruding too far
upon First Amendment rights.

10

Ben A. Montenegro

209 Id. The Court listed less restrictive alternatives: limiting the amount of noise,
number of protestors, or duration of protests. Id.
210 The New Jersey Supreme Court displayed such confusion in Murray v. Lawson,
where the court allowed a 100-foot buffer zone around the residence of an abortion
doctor. Murray v. Lawson, 138 N.J. 206, 234-35, 649 A.2d 1253, 1268 (1994). The
supreme court interpreted the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Madsen to
stand for nothing more than the premise that a 300-foot buffer zone was too large in
restricting First Amendment rights. Id. at 233, 649 A.2d at 1267 (citing Madsen, 114 S.
Ct. at 2530).
This confusion will continue unless the United States Supreme Court specifically
states whether the right to abortion or the right to privacy in the home specifically
allows for buffer zones and, if so, under what conditions. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
2534 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The entire injunction in

this case departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence ....

But the

context here is abortion."). Without a clear ruling, the courts will be inundated with
questions of measurements rather than competing constitutional rights. See, e.g., Murray, 138 N.J. at 233, 649 A.2d at 1267.

